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THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT WHO
PROPOSES PERJURY: RETHINKING
THE DEFENSE LAWYER'S DILEMMA
Norman Lefstein*
In a 1966 lecture, Professor Monroe H. Freedman was the
first to advance the unorthodox view for which he has become
well-known: A criminal defense lawyer must put his client on the
stand to testify even though he knows that the client will commit
perjury.' Subsequently, Professor Freedman defended his views in
article 2 and more recently refined his
an oft-quoted law review
3
presentation in a book.
The time is now ripe to reexamine the defense lawyer's dilemma when faced with a client who insists on testifying falsely.
Recently, the American Bar Association began to update and revise
its criminal justice standards, including its defense function standards (ABA Defense Function Standards). 4 ABA Defense Function
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. LL.B.,
1961, University of Illinois College of Law; LL.M., 1964, Georgetown University
Law Center. Professor Lefstein serves as the Reporter to the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice, which is
charged with updating the ABA's Defense Function Standards. The author gratefully
acknowledges the able assistance provided by William E. Bates, who made important
contributions to the preparation of this article. Also, special thanks are due to Professor Monroe H. Freedman who, more than anyone else, stimulated the author's thinking on the subject of the defense attorney's duty when faced with the client who
wishes to lie under oath.
1. Lecture by Monroe H. Freedman, Criminal Trial Institute, Washington, D.C.

(1966).
2. Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966).

3.

M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM

27-42 (1975)

[hereinafter cited as FREEDMAN]. Substantially the same material from Professor
Freedman's book is reprinted in Freedman, Perjury: The Lawyer's Trilemma, 1
LITIGATION 26 (1975).
4. For the ABA's defense function standards, see ABA, STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (Approved Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as -ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS]. The ABA has received approximately $160,000 from
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to review its 18 volumes of criminal
justice standards. ABA Press Release (July 2, 1977) (on file at the office of the Hofstra
Law Review). The project is under the auspices of the ABA's Special Committee on
the Administration of Criminal Justice. Id.
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Standards § 7.7 proposes a solution for the defense lawyer's handling of a client bent on perjury: The attorney should seek to
withdraw; if that fails, the defendant should be asked to make a
statement to the trier of fact, but his false testimony should not be
argued to the jury. 5 The ABA approach obviously differs from that
6
of Professor Freedman and it, too, has been criticized.
Indeed, while a lively debate on the client-perjury issue has
developed in the literature during the past decade, and while the
number of court decisions on the problem has increased during this
time, no single view has emerged predominant. Appellate decisions
are in disagreement, and often fail to analyze the problem fully. In
the course of this article, the various approaches for handling the
defendant's proposed perjury are discussed. Subsequently, I offer
my own suggestions for the defense lawyer's resolution of the perjury issue-suggestions which differ from Professor Freedman's and
the ABA Defense Function Standards.
DEFINING THE ISSUE

To understand the role of the defense attorney, it is helpful
first to define the nature of the perjury issue. We are not concerned with the lawyer who learns after his client has testified that
perjury was committed. Although the duty of the lawyer when this
occurs has not always been clear, recent developments have greatly
clarified the attorney's obligation. Most importantly, the ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility (the Code) was amended to provide
that an attorney cannot reveal a fraud perpetrated by his client
upon the court, when the source of the attorney's information of
the fraud "is protected as a privileged communication." 7 This pro5. ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 7.7. For the text of
§ 7.7, see note 39 infra.
6. See Sevilla, Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Ethical Perils of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 2 NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 237, 262 (1976).
7.

ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1976) [here-

inafter cited as ABA CODE]. More fully, DR 7-102(B)(1) states:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated
a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client
to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he
shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, except
when the information is protected as a privileged communication.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Id. DR 4-101(C) (footnotes omitted) specifies privileged information which a lawyer "may reveal":
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected,
but only after a full disclosure to them.
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vision of the Code, with a recent Formal Opinion of the ABA
Committee on Professional Ethics, makes clear that when knowledge of the client's past perjury derives from a "confidence" or
"secret," as it almost always will, the attorney may not divulge
his
client's crime. 8 In this situation, the policy favoring maintenance of
attorney-client privileges takes precedence, particularly since the
wrong already has been committed and the attorney played no role
in it.9
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to de-

fend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of
wrongful conduct.
For a discussion of DR 4-101(C)(3), see text accompanying notes 23 & 24 infra.
8. See ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL
OPINIONS, No. 341 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FORMSAL OPINIONS]. The definition of
"confidences" and "secrets" is contained in ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 4-101(A):
"'Confidence' refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under
applicable law, and 'secret' refers to other information gained in the professional
relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which
would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client." The
amendment to DR 7-102(B)(1), ABA Formal Opinion No. 341, and the duty generally
of attorneys to preserve confidences of clients relating to past crimes is discussed in
Callan & David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 332,
356-65 (1976). Counsel's duty to protect confidences related to past crimes also has
been stated in ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 1314 (1975) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as INFORMAL
OPINIONS]:
[The attorney], pursuant to the provisions of DR 7-102(B), has the primary
duty to protect the confidentiality of any privileged communication from
his client. Subject, however, to affording the client proper protection on the
basis of any privileged communication, the lawyer does have the obligation
to call upon his client to rectify the fraud; and if the client refuses or is
unable to do so, the lawyer may withdraw at that point from further representation of the client. See DR 2-110(C). In other words, the confidential
privilege, in our opinion, must be upheld over any obligation of the lawyer
to betray the client's confidence in seeking rectification of any fraud that
may have been perpetrated by his client upon a person or tribunal.
9. The analysis in this article is based on the assumption that a lawyer confronted with a client's intent to commit perjury is bound by the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code). However, in 1977 a special committee of the
ABA was appointed to evaluate the professional standards and to make recommendations concerning a new Code of Professional Responsibility. If a new code were to
authorize a lawyer to reveal the past frauds of his client, contary to ABA CODE,
supra note 7, DR 7-102(B)(1), a different approach would be available to lawyers for
handling the client-perjury problem. For a discussion of the desirability of permitting
attorneys to preserve the confidences of clients related to past and continuing
wrongs, see Callan & David, supra note 8.
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We also are not concerned with the criminal case where the
defense attorney strongly believes that his client is not being truthful and thus will probably commit perjury if he testifies during the
trial. Defense attorneys will attest to the frequency of cases where
there is substantial evidence that the client is lying, yet the client
adamantly, although unconvincingly, insists that he is innocent.
Sometimes the client will even alter the facts each time he tells the
attorney what happened, suggesting thereby that truth will have
little or nothing to do with his testimony at trial. Yet, in this situation, the attorney may allow the client to testify without fear of
suborning perjury, for one is guilty of that crime only if he induces
another to commit perjury.' 0 The ABA Defense Function Standards, moreover, adopt the position that the client may be permitted to testify as long as he insists upon his innocence."- Such a rule
is essential; otherwise, defense attorneys would constantly be judging the innocence of their clients, and then deciding whether to
allow them to testify. If this occurred, the adversary system of
criminal justice would no longer function as we now know it. 12
10. Federal law provides: "Whoever procures another to commit any perjury is
guilty of subornation of perjury ...." 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (1976). Similarly, the definition of subornation of perjury contained in CorpusJuris Secundum states:
[S]ubornation of perjury consists in procuring or instigating another to commit the crime of perjury....
It is essential to subornation of perjury that the suborner should have
known or believed or have had good reason to believe that the testimony
given would be false; that he should have known or believed that the witness would testify willfully and corruptly, and with knowledge of the falsity;
and that he should have knowingly and willfully induced or procured the
witness to give such false testimony.
70 C.J.S. Perjury § 79 (1951) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). For decisions
consistent with this definition, see Petite v. United States, 262 F.2d 788, 796 (4th
Cir. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 361 U.S. 529 (1960); People v. Jones, 254 Cal.
App. 2d 200, 217, 62 Cal. Rptr. 304, 316 (4th Dist. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 980
(1968); State v. Lucas, 244 N.C. 53, 54, 92 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1956). The defense

attorney who strongly believes that the client is lying obviously cannot be said to
have "procured" or "instigated" the false testimony. Similarly, the crime of subornation of perjury is not committed even where the defendant testifies falsely and the
attorney is aware of the false testimony, particularly if the attorney sought to dissuade the client from lying on the witness stand.
11. ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 7.7, Commentary:
"The existence of this dilemma [where the client proposes to commit perjury] is
predicated upon the defendant's admitting inculpatory facts to his lawyer which are
corroborated by the lawyer's own investigation. So long as the defendant maintains
his innocence, the lawyer's realistic appraisal that he is in fact guilty does not preclude a vigorous defense."
12. ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 7-102(A)(4) (footnote omitted), provides that
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The focus of this article, then, is on the defendant who tells
his lawyer, unequivocally, that he is guilty, but who proposes that
during the trial he deny his guilt and offer testimony which is fictitious. It is further assumed that the defense attorney has independent knowledge of the client's guilt that corroborates what the
client has told the attorney. 13 Some years ago, when I was actively
engaged in criminal defense work, I had just such a case. I was
appointed by the court to represent a defendant, whom I shall call
Mr. X, charged with the nighttime burglary of a barbershop. During my first interview with Mr. X, I explained the nature of the
attorney-client privilege, assuring him that I could not be compelled to divulge what he told me. Almost immediately the defendant confessed that he had broken into the barbershop, that he was
accustomed to having his hair cut there, and that he was arrested
near the scene of the break-in hiding in some bushes. The defendant explained that he took cover in the bushes when he heard
police sirens. I advised the defendant that I would "check out" the
Government's case against him and would be back in touch. From
the police officer who arrested the defendant, I learned that an
eyewitness saw the defendant both enter and leave the barbershop;
the witness then called the police and led them to the defendant
hidden in the bushes. According to the eyewitness, who made an
on-the-scene identification, there was no doubt that the defendant
was the person who entered the barbershop. I also learned that the
barbershop owner knew the defendant as a frequent patron of his
"a lawyer shall not . . . [kinowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence."
A
definition of "knowingly" is not contained in the Code; however, in criminal statutes the word is normally defined as including both actual knowledge and a belief
in the "high probability" of the existence of certain facts. Thus, MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(7) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) provides: "When knowledge of the existence
of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it
does not exist." For criminal cases which interpret "knowingly" similarly, see Leary
v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46 (1969); United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 702
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976); United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877,
881 (2d Cir. 1972). While it could therefore be argued that an attorney violates DR
7-102(A)(4) when he uses the defendant's testimony with strong reason to believe
that it is false, such an interpretation would seriously disrupt attorney-client relations
and the practice of criminal law. Probably for these reasons, there is apparently no
specific authority for the proposition that the Code is, in fact, violated when counsel
permits the defendant to testify to matters believed to be false.
13. See ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 7.7(a). This article also discusses the closely related problem of the defendant who wishes to commit perjury but who does not admit that he is guilty, see note 84 infra and accompanying text. See also Annot., 64 A.L.R.3d 385 (1975).
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establishment. In short, my investigation fully corroborated my
client's admission of guilt; though I had no reason to doubt my
client during our first interview, I was positive of his guilt upon
completing my investigation.
When I met with the client for our second interview, I
explained that the case against him was strong and that a successful
challenge to the eyewitness identification would be quite difficult. I
noted, however, that since no fruits of the crime were discovered
on his person and since his fingerprints were not found inside the
barbershop, there were at least some arguments we could make.
As I was about to explain that I thought it advisable to conduct
plea negotiations with the prosecutor, the client interrupted to
state that he would testify at the trial that he was with his girl
friend during the evening of the burglary, and that he was walking
home when he heard police sirens and hid in the bushes out of
fear. He further told me that he would explain to the jury that
because he had a prior record, which would be brought out on
cross-examination, he believed it likely that the police would blame
him for any criminal activity that might have occurred in the area.
As the finishing touch to his story, the client banded me a sheet of
paper with the name and telephone number of his girl friend, who
was prepared to corroborate his alibi for the period just prior to the
burglary.
Perhaps because of my relative youth and lack of experience in
criminal defense, I was shocked by what my client proposed. Instinctively, I advised the client that I could not permit him to testify, since his testimony would be perjury, and that I would not
call his girl friend as a witness for the same reason. Shortly thereafter, I left what had become an increasingly unpleasant interview,
telling the defendant to think over what I had said. The defendant
obviously did so; within a few days, I received a call from another
attorney, who advised me that he had been retained by my client's
father to provide representation in the case. 14 Out of curiosity, I
14. I did not divulge to the new attorney what the client had told me, This was
consistent with FORMAL OPINIONS, supra note 8, No. 268 (1945):
It is not infrequently the case that a lawyer who has been retained by a
client accused of crime, having been told by the client facts which make it
certain that the client is guilty, declines to represent the defendant, insomuch as a successful defense cannot be hoped for without suborning perjury under such circumstances. In such case, the lawyer is bound by the
Canon not to disclose the information received from the client in confidence, though he ascertains that the client, having subsequently retained
another lawyer, has, in his defense, stated the facts to be otherwise.
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later attended part of the trial and listened to what I knew to be
perjured testimony presented by my former client and his girl
friend. "Justice" triumphed, however; the defendant was convicted.
PROFESSOR FREEDMAN'S VIEW

At the time I represented Mr. X, Professor Freedman had not
yet written about what a lawyer should do when presented with a
client who wishes to commit perjury. Had I known about and followed the course which Professor Freedman was later to urge, I
might have continued to represent Mr. X and presented his perjured testimony. 15 Faced with Mr. X's desire to commit perjury,
my "obligation," according to Professor Freedman, was "to advise
the client that the proposed testimony [was] unlawful, but to proceed in the normal fashion in presenting the testimony and arguing
the case to the jury if the client [made] the decision to go forward."' 6 Primarily, this conclusion derives from what Professor
Freedman calls the lawyer's trilemma. 17 In criminal defense representation, the attorney must learn all the facts from his client, he
must keep them in strictest confidence, 8 and he must always be
candid in his dealings with the court.19 After examining these obligations and the alternatives to presenting perjured testimony, Professor Freedman concludes that the attorney cannot forego knowing
15. It would not have been proper, under any circumstances, to have allowed
the girl friend to present perjured testimony. The duty of the criminal defense
lawyer not to use false testimony of persons other than the defendant is wellestablished. See, e.g., Herbert v. United States, 340 A.2d 802, 804 (D.C. 1975);
People v. Pike, 58 Cal. 2d 70, 96, 372 P.2d 656, 672, 22 Cal. Rptr. 664, 680 (1962).
Although Professor Freedman concedes that there is an "important distinction" between collateral witnesses and the defendant when it comes to perjury, he appears to
suggest that defense counsel should use the perjured testimony of members of the
defendant's immediate family:
Certainly a spouse or parent [who sought to commit perjury] would be acting under the same human compulsion as a defendant, and I find it difficult
to imagine myself denouncing my client's spouse or parent as a perjurer and,
thereby, denouncing my client as well. I do not know, however, how much
wider that circle of close identity might be drawn.
FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 32.
16. FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 31.

17. Id. at 27-28.
18. Id. Professor Freedman refers, for example, to the "'sacred trust' of confidentiality [which] must 'upon all occasions be inviolable.'" Id. at 5 (citing Address
by Chief Justice Burger, Opening Session, American Law Institute (May 18, 1971),
reprinted in 52 F.R.D. 211, 212-14 (1971)). Elsewhere, Professor Freedman claims
that the "lawyer must hold in strictest confidence the disclosures made by the client
in the course of the professional relationship." Id. at 27.
19. Id.
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all of the facts, and that between confidentiality and candor to the
court, the former is significantly more important.
The problem with Professor Freedman's trilemma is that it
rests on the false premise that the confidentiality requirement
applies to a client's statement that he intends to commit the crime
of perjury. Historically, however, the attorney-client privilege has
never extended to the client who seeks legal assistance in the
commission of a future crime. 20 The law is succinctly stated in a
leading evidence treatise:
Since the policy of the privilege is that of promoting the
administration of justice, it would be a perversion of the
privilege to extend it to the client who seeks advice to aid him in
carrying out an illegal or fraudulent scheme. Advice given for
those purposes would not be a professional service but participation in a conspiracy. Accordingly, it is settled under modem authority that the privilege does not extend to communications between attorney and client where the client's purpose is the
furtherance of a future intended crime or fraud. 21
Thus, for example, in Sawyer v. Barczak,22 where a prospective state's witness told an attorney that he was prepared to commit
perjury if it would lead to dismissal of criminal charges pending
against him, the court held that the client's statements were not
privileged and that the attorney should have been allowed to testify
to what the client had said. The Code, moreover, states that a
lawyer may reveal the "intention of his client to commit a crime
and the information necessary to prevent the crime. "23 A client's
statements which reflect an intent to commit a crime are not
characterized by the Code as either "confidences or secrets. "24 The
Code's drafters must have recognized that no privilege attaches to
the client's statements concerning commission of future crime.
Consequently, if a lawyer reveals the client's intent to commit perjury, he is not revealing protected information; the attorney-client
20. It has been agreed from the beginning that the [attorney-client]
privilege cannot avail to protect the client in concerting with the attorney a
crime or other evil enterprise. This is for the logically sufficient reason that
no such enterprise falls within the just scope of the relation between legal
adviser and client.
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2298, at 572 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
21. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 95, at 199 (2d ed. 1972) (footnote omitted).

22. 229 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1956).
23. ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 4-101(C)(3) (footnotes omitted).
24. Compare ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 4-101(C)(3) with id. DR
4-101(C)(1)-(2), (4).
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privilege never covered the client's statements. This, of course,

does not answer the question whether the client's intent to commit
perjury should be disclosed. It does suggest, however, that Professor Freedman is inaccurate in claiming that all disclosures of the
25
client must be held in strictest confidence.
As a guide to the practicing attorney, there is another major

difficulty in Professor Freedman's analysis. The Code provides that
"a lawyer shall not ... [k]nowingly use perjured testimony or false

evidence." 2 6 To do so subjects the attorney to disciplinary santion. 27 In the case of Mr. X, for example, had I called my client to

testify I would have "knowingly" used perjured testimony. 28 Although Professor Freedman concedes the presence of the Code's
perjury prohibition, he offers no effective defense for an attorney
accused of ignoring it. Essentially, he argues that because the attorney's trilemma is not addressed in the Code, its clear admonitions against using perjury are not a problem. Therefore, the only
satisfactory course is for an attorney to preserve his client's confi29
dences.
25. Professor Freedman recognizes that there is a "major exception to the strict
rule of confidentiality" for the client's intent to commit a crime. FREEDMAN, supra
note 3, at 6. Elsewhere, however, Professor Freedman describes the duty of confidentiality in such broad terms as to suggest that a client's intent to commit perjury is
fully entitled to protection. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. For criticism
of Professor Freedman's view of the attorney-client privilege as overly broad, see
Rotunda, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REv. 622 (1976). Professor Freedman also argues that for counsel to seek to withdraw from the case is tantamount to informing
the court that the client has admitted his guilt to the lawyer. FREEDMAN, supra note
3, at 34. For a discussion of this argument, see notes 82-86 infra and accompanying
text.
26. ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 7-102(A)(4) (footnote omitted). The Code also
declares that a lawyer shall not "[p]articipate in the creation or preservation of evidence when he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false," id. DR 7-102(A)(6),
and shall not "[clounsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be
illegal or fradulent," id. DR 7-102(A)(7). The Code has been substantially adopted in
all states except California. See Callan & David, supra note 8, at 352.
27. See, e.g., In re Carroll, 244 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1951) (per curiam) (attorney
disciplined for knowingly allowing client to testify falsely). The disciplinary rules of
the Code are "mandatory in character" and "state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action." ABA
CODE, supra note 7, Preliminary Statement.
28. For a discussion of the meaning of "knowingly," see note 12 supra.
29. Professor Freedman's only specific response to the Code's prohibition
against the use of perjury is contained in four sentences. Referring to what he concedes to be, "at first reading," the apparently "unambiguous" obligation not to use
perjured testimony, Professor Freedman replies:
The difficulty, however, is that the Code does not indicate how the lawyer is
to go about fulfilling that obligation. What if the lawyer advises the client
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Aside from the law of confidentiality and the provisions of the
Code, there is another important reason that Professor Freedman's
position should be resisted. Ultimately, what Professor Freedman
advocates is a significant extension and corruption of the defense
attorney's role. In his view, the criminally accused is not only entitled to effective counsel, he is entitled to counsel who will provide
active assistance in presenting perjured testimony and who will
vigorously argue known perjured testimony to the jury. This is
surely the antithesis of what the lawyer's role ideally should be.30
To avoid assisting a client in presenting false testimony, it is
sometimes suggested that the attorney should seek to withdraw
from the case. 3 ' Professor Freedman criticizes this alternative, arguing that if the motion is granted, the identical perjured testimony will be presented anyway, because the client will acquire a
new attorney with whom he will not be candid; the new attorney
will then present the perjured testimony without knowing that it is
false.32 Although this scenario may be troublesome, it is preferable
to permitting the original attorney knowingly to present the perjured evidence. While a fraud may be practiced on the court, at
least the responsibility for the fraud will rest solely with the defenthat perjury is unlawful and, perhaps, bad tactics as well, but the client
nevertheless insists upon taking the stand and committing perjury in his or
her own defense? What steps, specifically, should the lawyer take? Just how
difficult it is to answer that question becomes apparent if we review the relationship between lawyer and client as it develops, and consider the contexts in which the decision to commit perjury may arise.
FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 29.
30. Consider the strong language in Introduction to ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION
STANDARDS, supra note 4, at 142:
It has even been suggested, but universally rejected by the legal profession, that a lawyer may be excused for acquiescing in the use of known perjured testimony on the transparently spurious thesis that the principle of
confidentiality requires this. While no honorable lawyer would accept this
notion and every experienced advocate can see its basic fallacy as a matter of
tactics apart from morality and law, the mere advocacy of such fraud demeans the profession and tends to drag it to the level of gangsters and their
"mouth-piece" lawyers in the public eye. That this concept is universally
repudiated by ethical lawyers does not fully repair the gross disservice done
by the few unscrupulous enough to practice it.
See also Dash, The Emerging Role and Function of the Criminal Defense Lawyer,
47 N.C.L. REV. 598, 630-32 (1969).
31. See ABA DEFENSE* FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 7.7(b). For the
text of this provision, see note 39 infra.
32. FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 33. The first attorney, moreover, is not authorized to reveal the client's proposed perjury to the second attorney. See FonMAL OPINIONS, supra note 8, No. 268 (1945).
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dant. No attorney will have sacrificed his integrity by serving as
an agent for a client by knowingly presenting false testimony. In

contrast, Professor Freedman does not concede that avoiding participation of attorneys in the client's crime is an objective worth
achieving.
No court decisions have been discovered which endorse Professor Freedman's view, but this absence of decisions might exist
because no attorney who has followed Professor Freedman's recommendation has been discovered. 3 3 In the mid-1960's, two wri-

ters did suggest that it would be permissible to allow the defendant
to present perjured testimony, although one urged that the lawyer

first seek to withdraw from the case, 34 and the other suggested that
the lawyer not argue the perjured testimony to the jury. 35 The

strongest endorsement of Professor Freedman's position has been
made by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Rules
Committee, which recommended that the state's defense representation standards provide that, where a client rejects an attorney's
advice not to commit perjury, "an attorney may examine him in
33. There is some evidence that practicing attorneys favor Professor Freedman's approach. In 1972, a second-year Georgetown University law student sent
questionnaires to 135 lawyers in Washington, D.C., in which he asked questions

about ethics. One question was what the attorney would do if, during a criminal trial,
the client whom the lawyer knew was going to perjure himself insisted upon taking
the witness stand. Ninety-five percent said they would call the defendant; three percent said they would not; and tvo percent said they would seek leave to withdraw. A
majority of the attorneys also said that they would elicit the testimony from the defendant in a normal fashion and argue the defendant's perjured testimony to the jury.
See Friedman, Professional Responsibility in D.C.: A Survey, 25 RES IPSA LoQurrUR
60 (1972). A somewhat similar questionnaire was sent to attorneys in Chicago several
years earlier. There, 58% of the lawyers surveyed disapproved of the attorney in a
criminal case allowing the defendant to present perjured testimony. However, of the
attorneys from small firms, 52% approved of permitting the defendant to perjure
himself, whereas only 12% of the attorneys from large firms approved of the practice.
See Reichstein, The Criminal Law Practitioner'sDilemma: What Should the Lawyer
Do When His Client Intends to Testify Falsely?, 61 J. Cnum. L.C. & P.S. 1, 7 n.74
(1970).
34. Bowman, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel:An
Attorney's Viewpoint, 5 Axi. CmM. L.Q. 28, 30 (1966).
35. Gold, Split Loyalty: An Ethical Problem for the CriminalDefense Lawyer,
14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 65, 71 (1965). Two recent articles also have discussed the
client-pejury dilemma. See Polster, The Dilemma of the Perjurious Defendant: Resolution, Not Avoidance, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 3 (1977); Wolfram, Client Perjury,
50 S. CAL. L. REv. 809 (1977). In the first of these articles, the author suggests that
the client's proposed perjury be handled in much the same manner urged in this
discussion. Compare Polster, supra at 34-37 with text accompanying notes 92-104
infra. The second article suggests that counsel inform the court of the client's perjury. Wolfram, supra at 853.
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the usual way, and may argue the validity of this testimony to the
jury." 36 This position, clearly influenced by Professor Freedman's
writings, was urged upon the Rules Committee by both the Massachusetts and Boston Bar Associations. 37 A final decision on the
issue has not yet been rendered by the Supreme Judicial Court of

Massachusetts. 38
ABA APPROACH
The ABA position concerning the defendant who wishes to
THE

commit perjury is articulated in section 7.7 of the ABA Defense

Function Standards. 39 First, the defense lawyer must seek to dissuade the client from testifying falsely. If this fails, the attorney

must attempt to withdraw from the case, but the reason for seeking
to withdraw should not be revealed to the court. 40 If withdrawal is
36. Levine, Struggling with Ethical Standards in Massachusetts,3 LITIGATION
43, 50 (1976).
37. See id.
38. Telephone conversation with Richard L. Levine (July 13, 1977) (author of
article cited note 36 supra).
39. ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 7.7 provides:
(a) If the defendant has admitted to his lawyer facts which establish guilt
and the lawyer's independent investigation establishes that the admissions are true but the defendant insists on his right to trial, the lawyer
must advise his client against taking the witness stand to testify falsely.
(b) If, before trial, the defendant insists that he will take the stand to testify
falsely, the lawyer must withdraw from the case, if that is feasible, seeking leave of the court if necessary.
(c) If withdrawal from the case is not feasible or is not permitted by the
court, or if the situation arises during the trial and the defendant insists
upon testifying falsely in his own behalf, the lawyer may not lend his aid
to the peijury. Before the defendant takes the stand in these circumstances, the lawyer should make a record of the fact that the defendant is taking the stand against the advice of counsel in some appropriate
manner without revealing the fact to the court. The lawyer must confine
his examination to identifying the witness as the defendant and permitting him to make his statement to the trier or the triers of the facts; the
lawyer may not engage in direct examination of the defendant as a witness in the conventional manner and may not later argue the defendant's
known false version of facts to the jury as worthy of belief and he may
not recite or rely upon the false testimony in his closing argument.
40. Paragraph (b) of § 7.7, which deals with the duty of a lawyer to withdraw, is
silent on whether the attorney should tell the court his reason for seeking to do so.
Id. § 7.7(b). However, paragraph (c), which pertains to the lawyer's duty if the motion to withdraw is denied, states that the defendant should be allowed to take the
stand, but that a record of the circumstances should be made by counsel without the
court being advised. Id. § 7.7(c). It follows, therefore, that counsel is not to tell the
court his reason for wishing to withdraw; otherwise, there would be no point in
stating that the court is not to be advised of the circumstances relating to the defendant's taking the stand. For the text of § 7.7, see note 39 supra.
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either unfeasible or not permitted by the court, the attorney
should confine direct examination of his client to permitting the
defendant to make a statement to the judge or jury. The lawyer,
however, should not rely upon the false testimony in his closing
argument. Section 7.7 also recommends that the lawyer record that
41
the client is testifying against counsel's advice.
For the attorney who cannot avoid the perjury problem by
withdrawing, the ABA position is a compromise. The defendant is
permitted to testify, yet the lawyer avoids offering his personal
support of the client's lies. Accordingly, the ABA position is regarded as a means of circumventing the prohibitions in the Code
42
pertaining to the use of "perjured testimony or false evidence"4 3
and "conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent."
The ABA recommendation, which was adopted in 1971, is consistent with views Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger expressed in
1966.44
In discussing the ABA approach, Professor Freedman offers an
intensely practical criticism: Suppose the prosecutor objects to the
defendant delivering a narrative on the grounds that it will not be
possible to know in advance if the defendant will make inadmissible statements.45 Trial lawyers ordinarily object when a witness is
asked to tell all he knows about a case, because such a broad question fails "to provide an orderly means by which objections to improper evidence can be raised and ruled upon before the evidence
is heard by the jury." 46 Thus, a trial judge might sustain the prosecutor's objection to defense counsel's general question to his
client. 47 Yet, neither section 7.7 nor the accompanying Commen41. The court is not to be advised of the record which is made by counsel. See
note 40 supra. For the text of § 7.7(c), see note 39 supra. The Commentary to § 7.7(c)

suggests that the "record" may be made, "for example, by having the defendant subscribe to a file notation, witnessed, if possible, by another lawyer." ABA DEFENSE
FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 7.7, Commentary.
42. ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 7-102(A)(4) (footnote omitted).
43. Id. DR 7-102(A)(7).
44. Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: A
Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRim. L.Q. 11, 13 (1966).
45.
46.

FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 37.
R. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS 185 (2d ed. 1973).

47. Normally, the decision to permit testimony in narrative form rather than by
question and answer is said to be committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. Compare Faust v. State, 319 N.E.2d 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1974) (trial
court held not to have committed error in allowing complaining witness to testify in
narrative form) with Deams v. State, 265 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1953) (trial
court held not to have committed error in denying defendant opportunity to testify in
-narrative form).
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tary offers any solution for what the defense lawyer should then do,
Presumably, the attorney could either examine the witness in the
normal fashion or advise the. court of the client's proposed perjury,
48
a solution which is examined later.
There appear to be only two reported decisions in which appellate courts have discussed the ABA's approach to the perjury
problem, 49 and they both illustrate the difficulty with section 7.7's
recommendation that lawyers attempt to withdraw from a case
under these circumstances. In State v. Lowery, 50 counsel moved to
withdraw during the direct examination of his client, apparently
because the client, much to counsel's surprise, began to testify
falsely. When the trial court asked counsel his reason for seeking to
withdraw and counsel replied that he could not state the reason,
the motion was denied. 51 In Thornton v. United States,52 the defense attorney moved to withdraw prior to the start of trial "for
moral ethical reasons." 53 The trial court, however, pressed the attorney for greater specificity and the attorney, contrary to the
ABA's recommendation, then revealed that the client had changed
his "story" and was planning to give false testimony. 54 The trial
court, apparently believing that he might now be prejudiced
against the defendant at sentencing, certified the case to a second
judge. Defense counsel again moved to withdraw, but this time
gave no reason for seeking to do so; accordingly, the second judge
denied the motion. 55 In affirming the defendant's conviction, the
48. See text accompanying notes 57-81 infra.
49. For cases in which § 7.7 of the ABA Defense Function Standards is mentioned, but in which proposed perjury of the client was not clearly at issue, see

People v. McCalvin, 55 Ill. 2d 161, 302 N.E.2d 342 (1973); People v. Brown, 54 Ill.
2d 21, 294 N.E.2d 285 (1973).
50. 111 Ariz. 26, 523 P.2d 54 (1974).
51. Id. Technically, State v. Lowery, id., did not involve a situation where
counsel should have sought to withdraw pursuant to § 7.7. Defense counsel in Lowery appears to have been unaware that the client intended to testify falsely, learning
of the false testimony only while the client was speaking from the witness stand.
Hence, the client already had committed the crime of perjury, without advance
knowledge of counsel, and counsel therefore would seem to have been duty-bound
to preserve the client's confidence regarding the crime just committed. See ABA
CODE, supra note 7, DR 7-102(B)(1). Moreover, the ABA Defense Function Standards do not envision counsel's withdrawal from the case "if the situation arises
during the trial and the defendant insists upon testifying falsely in his own behalf
." ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 7.7(c).

52. 357 A.2d 429 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976).
53. Id. at 432 (footnote omitted).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 435.
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appellate court ruled that the conduct of the second judge was
reasonable, because the specific grounds for counsel's motion to
56
withdraw were never disclosed.
TELLING THE COURT OF THE PROPOSED PERJURY

A third possible approach to the client-perjury problem is
simply to disclose the defendant's intention to the court. Although
section 7.7 does not suggest that a lawyer should reveal the client's
proposed perjury, the Commentary to the section implies that it
may be proper to do so:
On one hand, some lawyers hold that the lavyer's general obligation to protect the court from fraud in its processes and the
exception to the attorney-client privilege for statements of intention to commit a crime may place the lawyer in the position of
being required to disclose the fact of perjury. 57
The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
expresses important support for this position. In an Informal Opinion issued in 1975, the committee was asked to decide the duty of
an attorney "where a defendant in a criminal case, whether it be in
a traffic case or a felony case, insists upon taking the stand and
giving perjured testimony."5 s The committee replied that the
lawyer has only two alternatives: He must either withdraw from
the case before the client commits perjury or report the proposed
perjury to the court. According to the committee, "the right of a
client to effective counsel in any case (criminal or civil) does not
include the right to compel counsel to knowingly assist or participate in the commission of perjury or the creation or presentation of
false evidence. '' 9 Remarkably, section 7.7 of the ABA Defense
56. Id. at 435 n.9. The appellate court explained the propriety of the second
trial court's denial of counsel's motion to withdraw, stating:
Having been given no explanation for trial counsel's request to withdraw,
the second trial judge saw no justification for granting it. Defense counsel
indicated his lengthy association with the case and his extensive contact
with appellant. He also informed the court that he was retained, rather than

appointed, counsel. Forced to decide defense counsel's motion on less than
an adequate basis, the court's denial of the motion was reasonable.
Id. The second trial court's approach, affirmed by the appellate court in Thornton,
indicates that the recommendation of § 7.7 that counsel seek to withdraw when the
client wishes to present perjury is totally unworkable; the reason for counsel's mo-

tion to withdraw is not supposed to be revealed to the court, see note 40 supra.
57. ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 7.7, Commentary.
58. INFORMAL OPINIONS, supra note 8, No. 1314 (1975).
59. Id. The few opinions of state bar ethics committees on client-pejury are
consistent with this ABA ruling. Thus, the Florida bar grievance department has
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Function Standards approved four years earlier by the ABA, is not
even mentioned.

In two state appellate decisions, State v. Henderson60 and
State v. Robinson,61 defense counsel requested leave to withdraw
and, in doing so, advised the trial court that the defendant was

planning to present perjured testimony. In both cases, the appellate courts commended defense counsel for having acted in a pro-

fessionally responsible manner;62 the defendants, however, declined to testify after counsel advised the court that the testimony
63
would be untrue.
Suppose that the defendants in Henderson and Robinson re-

quested to testify despite what their attorneys had told the trial
courts. The question whether a criminal defendant who proposes to
commit perjury has an absolute right to testify remains. In Hender-

son and Robinson the appellate courts apparently assumed that the
trial judges were required to allow false testimony to be given by

the defendants. In Henderson the appellate court stated that "defendant was fully informed by counsel, as well as the court, of his
right to take the stand and 'tell his story,' but defendant declined
to do so." 64 Similarly, in Robinson the appellate court noted that
the trial judge inquired of the defendant "if he desired to take the

65
witness stand."

Neither Professor Freedman nor the ABA Defense Function

Standards discusses in detail whether a defendant has a right to
testify falsely. Professor Freedman says only that "there is a point

of view, which has been expressed to me by a number of experienced attorneys, that the criminal defendant has a 'right to tell his

story.'

"66

In the ABA's Defense Function Standards, the Commen-

stated that an attorney must seek to dissuade the defendant from committing perjury

and, if this fails, withdraw from the case. See Quiz, What Is Your Ethics Rating?, 50
FLA. B.J. 157, 158 (1976). Further, the grievance department suggests that the attorney "must take steps to prevent [the perjury] or to inform the court of its occurrence." Id. For criticism of the grievance department's position, see Glazer, What Arc
Limits of Lawyer's Professional Conduct in Defending a Client?, 50 FLA. B.J. 332
(1976). See also NEW JERSEY ADVISORY COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPIN-

IONS, No. 116, 90 N.J.L.J. 688 (1967).
60. 205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136 (1970).
61. 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976).
62. State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 238, 468 P.2d 136, 140-41 (1970); State v.
Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 66, 224 S.E.2d 174, 180 (1976).
63. State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 238, 468 P.2d 136, 140 (1970); State v.
Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 62, 224 S.E.2d 174, 177 (1976).
64. State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 238, 468 P.2d 136, 142 (1970).
65. State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 62, 224 S.E.2d 174, 177 (1976).
66.

FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 31.
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tary to section 7.7 refers, without citation of authority, to the "defendant's absolute right . . . to testify in his own behalf .... "67
Further Commentary to section 7.7, however, speaks somewhat less
certainly of the defendant's right to testify. Referring to the views
of "experienced defense counsel," the Commentary states: "Our

legal system, permitting the defendant to testify under oath, has
not, in their view, completely foreclosed to him the opportunity to
"68 Again, no citation of authority is prospeak to the jury ....

vided.
As a general rule, the defendant in a criminal case is entitled
to testify in his own behalf.6 9 When a defendant reveals to his
lawyer his intention to give perjured testimony, however, he argu-

ably may be precluded from testifying. Courts have held that when
a defendant misbehaves on the witness stand, the right to testify

may be deemed waived. Thus, in United States v. Ives, 70 where

the defendant's first trial ended in mistrial because of his miscon-

duct and he insisted that he be allowed to testify in the second
trial, the judge ruled that he could not do so because of his prior

disruptive conduct. 71 Twice the defendant took the stand. The first
time he refused to confine his testimony to the issues and cursed
the defense counsel and the judge; on the second occasion, the

defendant again verbally abused the court and his counsel and gave
unresponsive answers. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the trial court's actions, noting that the conduct of the
67. ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 7.7, Commentary.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Although courts recognize that a defendant should be allowed to testify in
his own defense, disagreement exists as to whether there is a "right" or "privilege"
to do so. Compare, e.g., United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 943 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963) (defendant has "privilege" to testify in his own behal)
with Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D.D.C. 1964), afl'd, 352 F.2d 639
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (defendant has "right" to testify in his own behalf). However, for a
recent case holding that a defendant has a "right" to testify, see Wilcox v. Johnson,
555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977). Courts sometimes fail to make clear whether the source
of the defendant's entitlement to testify rests on the due process clause, the right to
counsel, the self-incrimination privilege, or the compulsory process clause. See Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71, 119 (1974). Regardless of
the source of defendant's "right" or "privilege" to testify, it is clear that the right is
personal to the defendant. Thus, defense counsel cannot require that the defendant
forego the opportunity to testify. See, e.g., People v. Robles, 2 Cal. 3d 205, 214-15,
466 P.2d 710, 716, 85 Cal. Rptr. 166, 172 (1970); Ingle v. State, 546 P.2d 598, 599
(Nev. 1976). This is consistent with the ABA Defense Function Standards, which
provide that the decision whether to testify should be made by the accused. ABA
DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 5.2(a).
70. 504 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1974).
71. Id. at 938.
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defendant was sufficient to waive his opportunity to testify. 72 The
court of appeals analogized the right to testify with the right of the
accused to attend the trial, which may also be waived due to mis73
conduct.
Arguably, there is a basic difference between denying a defendant the right to testify because of proposed perjury and denial
because of disruptive activity. In the latter situation, the defendant
has unequivocally demonstrated that he must be controlled in the
courtroom; otherwise, the trial cannot proceed in orderly fashion.
Where proposed perjury is involved, the defendant has not yet
misbehaved, and the court has only defense counsel's report of
his client's intention. Even assuming that defense counsel's assessment of the client's intent is completely accurate, if the defendant
were to change his mind on the way to the witness stand, the
prediction of the client's proposed perjury would not be realized.
Nevertheless, decisions of the Supreme Court support the
proposition that a defendant lacks the constitutional right to present perjured testimony; however, the decisions do not address the
manner in which a defendant may be prevented from doing so. In
Harris v. New York, 74 the Court held that defendants could be
impeached with statements obtained in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona.75 In reaching this decision, the Court in dictum offered
the following view of defendants who testify: "Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to
do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right
to commit perjury. . . . Having voluntarily taken the stand,
petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately ....
72.
73.

-76

Id. at 943-44.
Id. at 941. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). Similarly, the accused

may be denied the right to conduct his own defense because of misconduct, Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975). In announcing the constitutional right to selfrepresentation, the Court stated:

We are told that many criminal defendants representing themselves may
use the courtroom for deliberate disruption of their trials. But the right of
self-representation has been recognized from our beginnings by federal law

and by most of the States, and no such result has thereby occurred. Moreover, the trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who
deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.
Id. at 834 n.46 (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970)). See also United States v.
Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
74. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
75. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
76. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (citations omitted).
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More recently, in United States v. Wong, 77 the Supreme
Court reaffirmed that when authorities mistakenly fail to warn a
person of the privilege against self-incrimination, the suspect is not
justified in offering perjured testimony. In Wong the defendant was
summoned before a grand jury and told of her fifth amendment
rights. 78 Due to her limited command of English, however, she did
not understand the prosecutor's warning and believed that she had
to answer all questions. Not wishing to incriminate herself, she
lied and was subsequently indicted for perjury. 79 At a suppression
hearing, the district court ordered the testimony suppressed. On
appeal to the Supreme Court, after affirmance by the Ninth Circuit, the Government conceded that defendant had not understood
her fifth amendment rights and hence, in legal effect, was unwarned
of her privilege against self-incrimination. The defendant argued
that since she was in effect forced by the Government to answer all
questions, her choice was confined either to incriminating herself
or lying under oath. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that
"the Fifth Amendment privilege does not condone perjury. It
grants a privilege to remain silent without risking contempt, but it
'does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit
perjury.' "80 It would seem to follow from Wong, and from the
cases on which it is based, 8 ' that if a suspect unwarned of the
privilege against self-incrimination has no right to present perjured
testimony, such a right is similarly unavailable to the criminal defendant who is aware of his privilege to remain silent.
VIOLATING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
CONCERNING THE CRIME CHARGED

Even if the defendant does not have an absolute right to present perjured testimony, there is a substantial problem with permitting the defense lawyer to tell the court of the client's proposed
perjury. Assume the defense attorney says to the judge: "My client
proposes to present perjurious testimony; I will not, therefore, call
him to the witness stand to testify." The trial judge will almost
77. 431 U.S. 174 (1974).
78. See id. at 175.
79. See id. at 175-76.
80. Id. (quoting Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 142 (1911)).
81. E.g., United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969) (peijurious information furnished on federal wagering tax return not justified even though return required to be
filed and truthful answers would have incriminated defendant). See generally United
States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
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certainly assume that the client has confessed his guilt to the attorney and is contemplating false testimony to conceal it. Such an
assumption by the trial court will mean that, as a practical matter,
the defense lawyer will have breached his confidentiality obligation. Unlike the attorney's duty when his client intends to commit
a crime, his duty to keep his client's confessions of past crimes
confidential is absolute.8 2 The same problem inheres in the ABA's
solution to a client's proposed perjury, as specified in section 7.7 of
the ABA Defense Function Standards. If a lawyer unsuccessfully
seeks to withdraw from his client's case, puts the client on the
witness stand, and asks him to make a statement, and then does
not argue the defendant's version to the jury, the trial judge will
almost surely recognize that the defense attorney is implementing
section 7.7 and that the defendant's testimony is false. 8 3 Further,
the judge will reason that the defendant has confessed guilt of the
crime charged to his attorney, which is why the attorney is following section 7.7 of the ABA Defense Function Standards.
82. Thus, in People v. Belge, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga
County Ct. 1975), where the client told his lawyers of the location of the bodies of
two women whom the client had murdered, and the attorneys personally verified the
accuracy of the client's information, the attorneys still "were bound to . . .maintain
what has been called a sacred trust of confidentiality." Id. at 190, 372 N.Y.S.2d at
802. No exception is contained in ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 4-101(C), for an
attorney revealing a client's confidence or secret relating to a past crime. For the text
of DR 4-101(C), see note 7 supra.
83. The recommendation contained in § 7.7 of the ABA Defense Function
Standards may have been so new following its approval by the ABA in 1971 that trial
judges might not have recognized the procedure. Now that the ABA's suggestion is
more than six years old, however, it seems likely that trial courts everywhere are
familiar with it. Indeed, when an attorney moves to withdraw from a criminal case
without giving his reasons, the assumption usually is that he has withdrawn because
the defendant wishes to commit perjury. For example, in Lessenberry v. Adkisson,
255 Ark. 285, 297, 499 S.W.2d 835, 841-42 (1973), the court observed:
It is apparent from the full record before us, that .. . Mr. Lessenberry

[, defense counsel,] had learned from the defendant matters he was unwilling
to reveal to the trial judge .... If Mr. Lessenberry was convinced of the
defendant's guilt ....
and if she was insisting that he prepare a fictitious

defense in her behalf, he of course was correct in requesting that be be
relieved as attorney of record ....
Similarly, in State v. Lowery, 111 Ariz. 26, 28, 523 P.2d 54, 56 (1974), the court
stated:
The defendant contends on appeal that by moving to withdraw . . .the

attorney was indicating to the court that the defendant was lying ....
The record does not reflect the reasons why the defendant's attorney
wished to withdraw, but we can surmise that he did not wish to assist the
defendant in perjuring herself on the witness stand as the evidence strongly
suggested she was doing when she denied under oath that she shot the
victim.
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It can be argued that the lawyer who tells the court of his

client's proposed perjury or who follows the ABA's formula has revealed neither a client's confidence nor his guilt. Technically, this
is true. The court has simply made assumptions which may in fact
be unjustified. Conceivably, the client wishes to commit perjury to
conceal embarrassing information. Indeed, the client may have insisted to his lawyer that he is totally innocent of the offense
charged, but he does not feel that he can publicly admit where he

was when the crime occurred.84 Experience suggests, however,
that it is much more likely that the client's perjury-as in the case

of Mr. X described earlier-will be aimed at concealing the client's
guilt. Accordingly, the trial court's assumption that the client has
fully confessed to the lawyer is apt to be accurate. Perhaps worse,
the court will assume the client's guilt even if he is innocent of the
crime charged and has never admitted his guilt to the lawyer.

Another problem may arise if the attorney informs the court of
the client's proposed perjury, and the court then asks the lawyer

how the intended testimony differs from the attorney's knowledge
of the truth.8 5 If the client has confessed his guilt to the attorney,

the attorney would have to tell the court that the question is not
one which he should be required to answer. Should this occur, the
court would almost certainly conclude that the client has confessed

his guilt to the attorney, and counsel's duty to protect the client's
confidences concerning past crimes will have been effectively

breached. 8

6

84. In writing about the client-perjury problem, Professor Freedman has advanced the hypothetical of the defendant charged with robbery who, though innocent of the offense, was accurately identified as being a block from the robbery five
minutes before it occurred. The defendant, according to the hypothetical, wishes to
commit perjury because he fears the jury will convict him if he admits he was in the
vicinity of the robbery so near the time that it transpired. See FREEDMAN, supra note
3, at 30-31.
85. A similar development occurred in Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429
(D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976). In Thornton the attorney moved to withdraw without disclosing his reasons. The trial court urged the attorney to be explicit
about his reason for wanting to get out of the case. For further discussion of
Thornton, see text accompanying notes 52-56 supra.
86. When the court asks a lawyer whether certain information is correct, and
the lawyer's knowledge of the information is privileged, it has been suggested that
counsel "ask the court to excuse him from answering the question . . . though this
would doubtless put the court on further inquiry as to the truth." FOIRMAL OPINIONS,

supra note 8, No. 287 (1953). The issue in Formal Opinion 287 was, inter alia,
whether an attorney is obligated to tell the court that his client has a prior criminal
record when, at sentencing, the court asks defense counsel about the existence of a
,record and counsel's knowledge of the record is protected by the attorney-client
privilege. Id.
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Finally, suppose that the trial court does assume that the
client has admitted his guilt to the lawyer. Besides having a complaint about a violation of the attorney-client privilege, the issue
whether defendant has a right to insist that a different judge try his

case is unresolved. Although the question has never been litigated,
in all likelihood he does not. While it may be preferable that a
different judge try the case, a court in pretrial proceedings will
often receive specific information about past offenses committed by
a defendant without being disqualified from presiding at the defendant's trial. 87 Moreover, where a court suspects that the defendant
has committed perjury, it has no specific information, but rather is

merely assuming that the defendant has admitted the offense to
counsel. In fact, even where a judge learns of a defendant's express
admissions of the crime charged, the judge often is permitted to
preside at a subsequent bench trial. In People v. Britt,8 8 the judge
in a bench trial was advised in a pretrial hearing of admissions the

defendant had made to police; however, it was agreed that these
statements would not be introduced by the prosecution. Thus, the
defendant was held not to be entitled to a new trial.8 9 Similarly,

87. There are numerous instances in which a district judge will be informed of the past deeds of a defendant before trial. Facts can come to a
judge's attention in pre-trial proceedings such as motions to suppress, reduction of bail, or for discovery. There is no rule that a trial judge must disqualify himself after presiding at these proceedings.
United States v. Montecalvo, 533 F.2d 1110, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 1976) (Real, J., dissent-

ing) (footnote omitted), vacated on rehearing,545 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1976). The issue
in Montecalvo was whether the trial judge was disqualified from presiding at the
defendant's jury trial for bank robbery. Prior to the trial, at the request of the defense
which contemplated that a guilty plea would be entered, the judge examined presentence materials concerning defendant's background. The plea was never entered,
however, and a trial ensued. On rehearing, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that it had been proper for the trial court to have read the presentence materials,
particularly since defense counsel had invited the court to do so. United States v.
Montecalvo, 545 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of disqualification of
judges for reading presentence materials prior to trial, see note 90 infra.
88. 37 Mich. App. 175, 194 N.W.2d 528 (Ct. App. 1971).
89. Id. Obviously, if a judge is not disqualified from acting as factfinder in a
bench trial, he would not be precluded from presiding at a jury trial, where the jury
serves as the trier of fact. For a discussion of cases similar to Britt, see Note, Improper Evidence in Nonjury Trials: Basis for Reversal?, 79 HAnv. L. REV. 407
(1965). Contrary to Britt and similar holdings, Chief Justice Burger has stated: "In a
nonjury case the prior record of the accused should not be made known to the trier
of fact except by way of traditional impeachment." Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25, 42 n.* (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also People v. Ramsey, 385 Mich.
221, 187 N.W.2d 887 (1971) (conviction reversed where, during bench trial, judge
"glanced" at transcript of preliminary hearing).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss3/10

22

Lefstein: The Criminal Defendant Who Proposes Perjury: Rethinking the Defen

1978]

CRIMINAL DEFENDANT PERJURY

federal courts have sometimes held that a judge is not disqualified
from presiding at a defendant's trial even though presentence
materials on the defendant are examined in advance. 90
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: WARN THE CLIENT OF
THE SCOPE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

The preceding analysis suggests that none of the three principal approaches to handling the client's proposed perjury is entirely
satisfactory. Professor Freedman's suggestion of treating the perjurious client like any other witness means that the attorney assists
the client in breaking the law. In addition, Professor Freedman's
view requires that the lawyer violate the clear admonitions of DR
7-102(A)(4) and DR 7-102(A)(7) which prohibit the lawyer from
using his client's perjured testimony and from assisting him in illegal conduct. 91 The ABA's approach, as outlined in section 7.7 of
the ABA Defense Function Standards, is also imperfect. 92 Permission to withdraw from a criminal case is frequently denied, 93 and
the defendant may not be allowed by the court, over the prosecutor's objection, to make the suggested narrative statement. 94 In
addition, under both the ABA's approach and the third alternative-revealing the client's proposed perjury to the court-the
90. See United States v. Duhart, 496 F.2d 941, 945-46 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Small, 472 F.2d 818, 820-22 (3d Cir. 1972) (dictum); Webster v. United
States, 330 F. Supp. 1080, 1086 (E.D. Va. 1971). Contra, United States v. Pruitt, 341
F.2d 700, 702 (4th Cir. 1965) (dictum). In Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489
(1969), the Supreme Court in dictum suggested that district court judges should
never examine a presentence report prior to presiding at a defendant's jury trial. Id.
at 491. The Court explained that the purpose of rule 32 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which then provided that the "report shall not be submitted to
the court ... unless the defendant has pleaded guilty... or has been found guilty,"
FED. R. Canis. P. 32(c)(1) (amended 1974), was designed to prevent possible prejudice of the judge by exposing him to unfavorable information about the defendant.
Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489, 491-92 (1969). However, rule 32 was amended
effective December 31, 1975, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act
of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, §§ 32-33, 89 Stat. 370, to provide that a presentence
report may be submitted to the court at any time with the written consent of the
defendant. The foregoing cases indicate that lower federal courts have carved exceptions to the broad prohibition suggested in Gregg. For example, in Duhart, the court
held that the trial judge did not err when, prior to sentencing, he familiarized himself with a prison report relating to the defendant, since the document technically
was not prepared as a presentence report pursuant to rule 32. See United States v.
Duhart, 496 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1974).
91. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
92. For the text of § 7.7, see note 39 supra.
93. See text accompanying notes 50-56 supra.
94. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
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lawyer's conduct is tantamount to revealing privileged information,
because the court invariably will assume that the client has confes95
sed guilt of the crime charged to his attorney.
Because of the difficulties inherent in these proposals, I believe a different approach is justified-one which will simultaneously reduce the likelihood of the problem arising and also clarify
the lawyer's appropriate conduct if his client nevertheless proposes
perjury. Accordingly, I suggest that at the beginning of their relationship, the defense attorney advise his client of the scope of the
attorney-client privilege. For example, the attorney might inform
his client:
Anything you tell me is privileged. That is, I cannot reveal
what you tell me to anyone, including the judge. However, I can
reveal information about a crime you are planning to commit, including the crime of perjury. Thus, if you were planning to lie on
the witness stand in your forthcoming trial, I could reveal this fact
to the court. Now, of course, I am not assuming that you are planning to do this, but I did think that, in fairness, I ought to explain to you how the attorney-client privilege works.
Such an approach is consistent with the recommendation of the
Canadian Bar Association, which provides in its Code of Professional Conduct: "Admissions made by the accused to his lawyer
may impose strict limitations on the conduct of the defense, and
the accused should be made aware of this."96 In other words, the
lawyer who seeks candor from the client should be candid in return; there are limits on what is included within the attorney-client
privilege, and the client should be told what these limits are.
This proposed admonition is not intended as an invitation to
clients to lie to their lawyers or to conceal information. Nor is
there any reason to believe that it would have that effect, except in
the few cases where clients are intending to commit perjury and
are prepared to admit that this was their intent prior to speaking to
their attorneys. If the client was planning to lie to the lawyer prior
to receiving the attorney's admonition concerning proposed perjury, he will proceed to do so. On the other hand, if the client was
planning to be truthful with the lawyer, there is no reason to believe that the proposed admonition will discourage his honesty. Accordingly, I believe that attorneys should continue to impress upon
95. See text accompanying notes 82-86 supra.
96. CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,
Commentary 9 (1974) (emphasis added).
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their clients that the entire truth is needed if an effective defense
97
is to be prepared.

In contrast, the ABA Defense Function Standards state: "The
lawyer should explain the necessity of full disclosure of all facts
known to the client for an effective defense, and he should explain
the obligation of confidentiality which makes privileged the accused's disclosures relating to the case."9 The standards do not
suggest that the client should be made aware of any of the limitations attached to the attorney-client privilege.9 9 Thus, under the
ABA approach, if the client admits inculpatory facts to the attorney
and then insists upon testifying falsely, the attorney is obliged to
follow the commands of section 7.7, thereby revealing to the court,
for all practical purposes, that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged. The defendant at this point is likely to feel deceived,
since his attorney failed to keep his promise of confidentiality.
Alternatively, assume that the attorney seeks leave to withdraw pursuant to the ABA Defense Function Standards, and his
motion is granted. Then, if the client still wishes to present perjured testimony, he will simply fail to be honest with his second
attorney. The client will tell the lawyer his proposed testimony,
97. See I A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL, & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE
DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 79, at 2-48 (1967):
The client must be told very explicitly that counsel expects him to tell counsel the truth, the whole truth, and the exact truth; that failure to do so will
hamstring presentation of the defense. If the client has done this thing,
counsel has to know it. He will represent the client anyway (and should tell
the client this), but he must know the truth. Admonition that counsel will
learn the truth in court, together with the judge and jury, and that he cannot
be prepared to meet it unless he knows it in advance, is helpful. Reminding
a client that he, the defendant, will guffer the consequences of any wrong
information helps to convince him of the necessity to be truthful.
98. ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 3.1(a).
99. See Commentary to § 3.1, dealing with the desirability of the attorney-client
privilege:
Nothing is more fundamental to the lawyer-client relationship than the establishment of trust and confidence. Without it, the client may withhold
essential information from the lawyer. The result may be that the case is
prepared by counsel without important evidence that might have been obtained, that valuable defenses are neglected and, perhaps most significantly,
that the lawyer is not forewarned of evidence which will be presented by
the prosecution. It is to encourage candor and full disclosure that the obligation of confidentiality which surrounds the lawyer-client relation has been
erected. The Canons of the American Bar Association reflect the ancient
doctrine that a lawyer must preserve all confidences which relate to the representation of the accused.
ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 3.1, Commentary.
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but he will not admit that it is false. As noted earlier, the client
will be able to present false testimony, and no member of the bar
will knowlingly provide assistance to the criminal enterprise. 100
The ABA's approach, therefore, is not really aimed at prohibiting
perjured testimony, but is instead directed toward the laudable objective of disengaging lawyers from involvement with it. Essentially, then, the ABA's approach recognizes that prevention of perjury by the client is impossible. Warning the client in advance that
his intent to commit perjury is not privileged is predicated on the
same premise, except that it is far more straightforward. The client
who is adamant about presenting perjury will know the rules at the
outset and, if he desires to be dishonest, his dishonesty presumably
will be practiced on the first lawyer, thereby avoiding the difficulties incident to withdrawal and retention or assignment of new
counsel. 101
Professor Freedman rejects the proposal of the Canadian Bar
Association, because he believes that the proposal may require the
attorney to sacrifice obtaining complete knowledge from the
client.' 02 The cases where complete knowledge will be sacrificed,
however, are precisely those where the client otherwise would
have conceded his guilt to the lawyer and then would have insisted
upon testifying falsely. Where this occurs, as we already have seen,
the lawyer is thrust into an impossible dilemma. Rather than aiding
in the client's defense, the complete knowledge furnished to the
lawyer greatly complicates the client's continued representation.
Indeed, the difficulty for the lawyer is so substantial that Professor
Freedman argues that the only appropriate action is for counsel
knowingly to aid the client in presenting perjured evidence. Ironically, where the client insists on perjury and Professor Freedman's
view is followed, the truth acquired from the client will no doubt
enable counsel to be more effective in presenting and
arguing the defendant's false evidence. Fortified with precise knowledge of what really happened, counsel should be better able to
cross-examine the prosecutor's truthful witnesses. Conversely, under the approach recommended here, counsel who unwittingly
presents the perjured testimony of a defendant may be less effective. Since the defendant's testimony is completely false, however,
there should be no great concern that defense counsel might have
100.
101.
102.

See text accompanying notes 31 & 32 supra.
See text accompanying notes 50-56 supra.
FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 38.
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been 3a more compelling advocate had he known of his client's
lies.10
CHOOSING PROFESSOR FREEDMAN'S VIEW, THE

ABA

APPROACH, OR REVEALING PROPOSED PERJURY TO THE COURT

Suppose that the attorney advises the client that a plan to
commit perjury is not protected as a confidential communication.
Assume further that despite what the lawyer has told the client,
the client admits that he is guilty of the offense but still insists that
he wishes to present perjured testimony. If the client cannot be
dissuaded from doing so, counsel must decide upon his actions.
My preference would be either to follow the ABA approach or
to reveal the client's proposed perjury, depending upon which
course I thought would be the least disadvantageous to the client.
For example, if the client's proposed perjury was so incredible that

I felt certain the jury would never believe it and the judge would
become angry upon hearing it, I probably would tell the court
about the client's proposed perjury. Conceivably, the court would
then either discourage the client from testifying or deny him the

opportunity to do so. As discussed previously, however, regardless
of which approach is used, the court will assume that the client has
admitted his guilt to the attorney.' 0 4 Nevertheless, I believe either
of these approaches is justified because the client will have been
warned from the very beginning that his intent to commit perjury
was unprotected by the attorney-client privilege. If the client is
prejudiced by the attorney's conduct, the client has only himself to
blame; the attorney should not have to assume responsibility for
the client's criminal designs.
Ultimately, in deciding which of the three principal alternatives to follow, the attorney must decide whether it is preferable to
violate the client's confidence, by implicity signaling to the court
the client's guilt of the crime charged, or explicit ethical standards,
103. There is one undeniable drawback to warning the accused that his proposed perjury is not protected by the attorney-client privilege. Counsel may lose the
opportunity to dissuade some defendants from testifying falsely, because they will
not have admitted to counsel that they are guilty. I regard this as a minimal problem,
however, compared with the vexing dilemma confronted by counsel where the client
admits his guilt, wants to commit perjury, and cannot be dissuaded from doing so.
Moreover, it seems likely, though scarcely subject to proof, that the defendant who
acknowledges his guilt to counsel and then proposes to commit perjury has given the
matter considerable thought. Therefore, it may be exceedingly difficult to dissuade
him from committing perjury. Certainly this was true in the case of Mr. X discussed
earlier. See text accompanying notes 13 & 14 supra.
104. See text accompanying notes 82-86 supra.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1978], Art. 10
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 6: 665

by knowingly using the client's perjured testimony. The decision
obviously involves difficult value judgments which remain unresolved under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Code,
like the law of evidence relating to attorney-client privileges, states
both that there is no exception for revealing past crimes which the
client has confided in the lawyer and that perjured testimony may
05
not knowingly be used.'
CONCLUSION

The recommendation of this article-that the attorney advise
the defendant at the beginning of their relationship that the intent
to testify falsely is not a privileged communication-anticipates the
client-perjury problem before it arises. In contrast, neither Professor Freedman's approach nor that of the ABA Defense Function
Standards attempts to deal with the client's proposed perjury until
it is too late. When a client tells the lawyer that he intends to
commit perjury after the lawyer has assured the client that all of
his communications are confidential, or after the client believes
that they are confidential, it is difficult to justify action which is
tantamount to revealing to the court the client's acknowledgment of
guilt. While Professor Freedman's approach preserves the client's
communications beyond that required by the law of evidence or
the Code of Professional Responsibility, it also requires that the
defense attorney serve as the client's active agent in presenting
perjured testimony. Therefore, it is preferable simply to inform the
client, at the outset, of the specific scope of the attorney-client
privilege. If subsequently the defense attorney, either implicitly or
explicitly, reveals the defendant's proposed perjury, at least the
client will not have been deceived into thinking that everything
told to the lawyer was confidential.
105. See notes 7-9, 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
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